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I. Introduction
Moreimmigrants will enter the United States during the 1990s than in any other decade in
the country's history. We are now admitting over 800,000 legal immigrants annually, and at least
200,000 illegal aliens manage to evade the Border Patrol and settle permanently in the country. In
view of the increase in the number of immigrants, as well as in the historic changes in their
national origin and skill composition, it is not surprising that immigration has again become a
charged political issue. Previous immigration debates revolved around the questions of whether
imuiigrants assimilated in the United States and whether they took jobs away from natives. The
rapid growth of entitlement programs in the.past three decades introduces an additional explosive
question into the arena: Do immigrants "pay their way" in the welfare state?
The conventional wisdom regarding immigrant participation in welfare programs has
changed drastically in recent years. Blau's (1984) study, which analyzed data drawn from the
1976 Survey of Income and Education, concluded that immigrant households had a lower
probability of receiving public assistance than U.S-born (or "native") households.' The more
recent work of Borjas and Trejo (1991), based on thejoint study of the 1970 and 1980 Censuses,
concluded that by 1980 immigrant households were more likely to participate in welfare programs
than native households.
'SecalsoSimon (1984),Tienda and Jensen (1986) and Jensen (1988).2
More importantly, Borjas and Trejo noted that the increase in immigrant welfare
participation could be attributed to two distinct factors. First, more recent immigrant waves had
higher probabilities of receiving public assistance than earlier waves. In other words, the "cohort
effects" in immigrant skills which have studied extensively in recent years (Borjas. 1955, 1990)
manifest themselves as higher welfare propensities for the more recent and relatively less skilled
immigrant waves.2 In addition, the welfare participation rate of a particular cohort increases over
time (relative to the change in welfare participation rates experienced by native households as they
age). Put differently, immigrants assimilate jfl the welfare system.
This paper uses the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Public Use Samples of the U.S.Censusto trace
the evolution of immigrant participation in welfare programs during the past two decades. The
paper has two key objectives. First, to determine if the trends in welfare participation rates
evident in the data drawn from the 1970 and 1980 Census continued during the 1980s. The paper
also analyzes the impact of immigration on the costs of providing welfare programs. These
calculations yield usefiñ insights into the question of whether immigrants pay their way in the
welfare system.
In view of the potential policy implications of the results, it is important to provide an
empirical analysis that is both convincing and that can be replicated easily by other researchers.
As a result, much of the empirical evidence reported in this paper is based on "raw" statistics
drawn directly from the various Census files. These calculations do not impose any type of
parametric or statistical structure on the data. Although I also report the results of a more formal
statistical analysis based on a regression model that allows the identification of assimilation,
2Othcr studies which report sizable cohort effects in the skills of immigrants since 1965 include
LaLonde and Topel (1992)andFunkhouserandTrejo (1994).3
cohort, and period effects, the regression results simply "repackage" the key insights provided by
the raw Census statistics.
The conclusions of the analysis are striking and can be easily summarized. First,
immigrant participation in welfare programs is on the rise, and the dollar costs associated with this
disturbing trend are rising even faster.Second,the empirical evidence unambiguously indicates
that immigrants now receive a disproportionately high share of the cash benefits distributed in the
United States.
II. Data and Summary Statistics
I use data from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Public Use Samples of the decennial Censuses.
The household is the unit of observation. A household is classified as an immigrant household if
the household head was born outside the United States and is either an alien or a naturalized
citizen. All other households are classified as native households. This definition of immigration
status implies that persons born abroad of American parents or persons born in U.S. possessions
(such as Puerto Rico) are classified as native households.3 Finally, the year of immigration of the
household is determined by the household head's year of arrival to the United States.4
3Bccause Puerto Ricans form the bulk of "natives' born outside the United States and because they also
have exceptionally high welfare participation rates, it is evident that the definition I use to ducrmine the
nativity status of a household overstates the average welfare participation rate of persons born in one ol
the 50 states.
4In the 1970 Ccnsus file, about 2,9 percent of houschold heads who report a foreign birthplace do not
report the year of migration. This sample of persons is deleted from the analysis below. It is worth
noting that the households that have missing information on the years-since-migration variable do not
form a random sample of the immigrant population. have much higher ttl1are participation rates
than the immigrants who do report their year of migration to the United States.4
Unless otherwise specified, the 1970 Census data used in the empirical analysis consists of
a 1/1000 random sample of native households, and ofa 2/100 random sample of immigrant
households. The immigrant extract is constructed by pooling the 1/100 State and County Files (5
percent questionnaire). The 1980 Census data consists of a 1/1000 random sample of native
households, and ofa 5/100 random sample of immigrant households. The immigrant extract is
drawn from the A File of the 1980 Census. Finally, the 1990 Census data consists of a SR 000
random sample of native households, and ofa 51100 random sample of immigrant households.5
The empirical analysis is restricted to households not residing in group quarters and headed by
persons who are at least 18 years of age.
As in previous studies, I classi' a household as receiving public assistance if any member
of the household received public assistance income in the calendar year prior to the Census. The
cash benefit programs for which the Census reports public assistance income include Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and general
assistance. The decennial Censuses do not contain any information on the household's
participation in non-cash assistance programs, such as Food Stamps and Medicaid.
Table 1 reports the welfare participation rates (i.e., the percent of households receiving
public assistance) calculated in the various Censuses. A number of results are clear. In 1970,
immigrants were slightly less likely, on average, to receive cash benefits than natives. By 1980,
the direction of the differential had reversed and immigrants were about I percentage point more
likely to receive public assistance. During the 3980s, the "welfare gap" between imthigrant and
native households widened substantially. WhUe native households experienced a decline in the
SThe Public Use Sample of the 1990 Census (unliketheearlier Ccnsuscs) is nol a random sample of the
population. lisa result. I use the household's sampling weight throughout the analysis.TABLE I
WELFARE PARTICIPATION RATES OF NATIVE
AND IMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS, 1970-1990
(Percent of Households Receiving Public Assistance)
Male-Headed Female-Headed
GIOUD AllHouseholds Households Households
197019801990 1970 19801990 197019801990
Natives 6.0 7.9 7.4 3.7 4.7 4.4 14.8 16.1 13.5
AllImmigrants 5.9 8.7 9.1 4.5 6.4 6.9 10.414.714.4
Cohort:
1985-1989 Arrivals --- 8.3 --- --- 7.0 ------ 13.2
1980-1984 Arrivals --- 10.7 --- --- 8.3 --- --- 19.1
1975-1979 Arrivals 8.3 10.0 --- 6.9 7.3 ---14.619.1
1970-1974 Arrivals 8.4 9.7 --- 5.8 6.7 --- 19.118,7
1965-1969 Arrivals5.510.1 9.8 4.47.0 6.7 11.720.517.8
1960-1964 Arrivals6.5 9.2 8.4 4.9 6.3 6.2 14.518.313.6
1950-1959 Arrivals 4.9 7.1 6.7 3.5 4.8 5.1 12.114.110.3
Pre-1950 Arrivals6.2 9.3 8.1 4.7 7.3 7.0 9.8 12.3 9.4
SampleSize:
Immigrants 86.201298,045 357,29464,980 214,502 256,99921,221 83.543 100,295
Natives 58,958 72,733 423,46846,653 52,635 290.22812.305 20.098 133,2405
welfareparticipation rate, immigrant households experienced an increase. By 1990,the welfare
participation rate of immigranthouseholds was 9.1 percent, or about 1.7 percentage points higher
than the participation rate of native households.
As in the Borjas-Trejo (1991) analysis, two distinct factors "explain" the disproportionate
increase in welfare participation among immigrant households. Table I shows that the 1980s
witnessed a continuation of the trend wherein more recent immigrant waves have relatively higher
welfare participation rates than earlier waves. For example, in 1970 only 5.5 percent of the most
recent immigrant households (i.e.. households that have been in the United States fewer than five
years) received welfare; and in both 1980 and 1990, 8.3 percent of the newly-arrived immigrant
households received public assistance. Although the welfare participation rate of the most
recently arrived immigrant households remained constant between 1980 and 1990, the imrnierant
reciDiency rate rose relative to that of native households. In 1980, for example, the probability
that the most recently arrived immigrants received public assistance exceeded that of native
households by only .4 percentage points; by 1990, the immigrant rate was almost I percentage
point higher. Among households that have been in the United States between five and ten years,
there has been a rise (both absolutely and relatively) in welfare participation rates over the last
two decades: from 6.5 percent in 1970, to 8.4 percent in 1980, and to 10,7 percent in 1990.
Table 1 also indicates that not only are recent waves more "welfare-prone," but that the
welfare participation rate for a specific wave of immigrant households increases over time. Even
though only 5.5 percent of the households that migrated between 1965 and 1969 received public
assistance in 1970. the welfare participation rate of this group had increased to about 10 percent
in both 1980 and 1990. Similarly, households who arrived between 1975 and 1979 had a welfare
participation rate of 8.3 percent in 1980 and of 10.0 percent in 1990.6
The Census data reveal that these trends occur among both male-headed and female-
headed households. Among male-headed households, for example, the participation rate of the
most recent wave increased by 2.6 percentage points between 1970 and 1990, as opposed to the
.7 percentage point rise experienced by male-headed native households over the same period
Similarly, among female-headed households, the welfare participation rate of the most recent
wave increased by 1.5 percentage points, in contrast to the 1.3 percentage point decline
experienced by female-headed native households.
As in earlier studies, the 1990 Census reveals substantial differences in welfare
propensities among national origin groups. Table 2 reports the welfare participation rates for
selected groups. The dispersion in welfare propensities across national origin groups is
remarkable. Only about 2 to 4 percent of the households originating in South Africa, Taiwan. or
the United Kingdom receive public assistance, as opposed to Ii to 12 percent of the households
originating in Ecuador or Mexico, and nearly 50 percent for households orieinating in Laos or
Cambodia. Table 2 also shows that the variation in welfare propensities across national origin
groups cannot be explained by differences in the number of years that the various groups have
resided in the United States. Even among households who are "long-time" residents, welfare
participation rates differ significantly across groups: 4 percent ofGernian inimitrants. ] 1 percent
of Filipino immigrants, and 30 percent of immigrants from the Dominican Republic receive
welfare even after 10 years in the United States.
The statistics presented in Table 2 suggest a major "structural shift" between two types of
immigrant households. In particular, reftigee households tend to exhibit much higher rates of
welfare participation than non-reftigee households. As noted earlier, households originating in
Cambodia or Laos had a welfare participation rate of near 50 percent; those originating inTABLE 2. WELFARE PARTICIPATION RATES IN 1990, BY NATIONAL ORIGIN GROUP
AllImmigrants Pre-1980 Arrivals
Country of Birth Percent on Sample Percent on Sample
Welfare Size Welfare Size
Europe:
Austria 4.3 2,407 4.5 2.299
Czechoslovakia 4.9 2,320 4.9 2,111
France 4.8 2,613 5.9 2.054
Germany 4.1 17,198 4.2 16.143
Greece 5.5 4,196 5.6 3.351
Hungary 5.1 3,142 5.1 2.943
Italy 5.4 15,220 5.6 14,626
Poland 3.7 9,437 5.9 7,643
Portugal 7.1 3,903 7.6 3,293
U.S.S.R. 16.3 7,133 10.1 5.387
UnitedKingdom 3.7 14,928 4.1 12,279
Yugoslavia 5.3 3,339 5.7 3.000
Asia:
Cambodia 48.8 1,560 24.4 317
China 10.4 9,804 11.1 6,034
India 3.4 8.092 4.2 4,572
Iran 7.5 4,317 4.1 2,747
Japan 2.3 4,860 3.7 2.551
Korea 8.1 8,286 8.6 4.163
Laos 46.3 2,197 34.1 595
Lebanon 7.3 1,722 8.8 1,039
Philippines 9.8 13839 10,5 9.312
Taiwan 3.3 4,005 4.2 1,660
Vietnam 25.8 7,170 15,9 3.283
North and South America:
Argentina 4.8 1,972 5.7 1,445
Canada 4.8 18,398 5.1 16,401
Colombia 7.5 4,713 8.9 2,972
Cuba 16.0 16,472 15.3 13,197
Dominican Republic 27.9 5,124 29.9 3,280
Ecuador 11.9 2,279 13.8 1,631
El Salvador 7.3 6,047 10.2 2.409
Guatemala 8.7 2,982 11.4 1,426
Haiti 9.1 3,359 97 1.781
Jamaica 7.5 5,512 3.7 3,793
Mexico 11.3 68,076 12.8 47.630
Nicangua 7.8 2,144 11.8 325
Panama 9.0 1,488 8.7 1,131
Peru 5.9 2,304 7.8 1.268
Africa:
Egypt 5.5 1.578 6.7 1.039
Ethiopia 5.9 601 3.0 181
Nigeria 3.2 1,164 3.3 449
South Africa 1.6 680 1.6 361
Australia 3.7 834 3.8 5697
Vietnamhave a welfare participation rate of 25.8 percent; while those originating in Cubaor the
Soviet Union have a participation rate of 16 percent. Moreover, the participation rate ofrefugee
households remains high even after a decade in the United States. RefUgeegroups that are
thought of as being economically successfUl, such as the pre-1980 Cubans (i.e., Cubans who
migrated prior to the Mariel flow), have a welfare participation rate of over IS percent in 1990
The high propensity of refugee households to enter (and stay in) the welfaresystem is the
likely result of government policies designed to ease the transition of refugees into the United
States. Persons who enter the country as refUgees or political asylees have immediate access toa
wide array of social services and programs that neither other legal immigrants nor natives qualia'
for. The impact of this introduction to the welfare state seems to be both profound and long-
lasting.
Because refugees accounted for 12 percent of the immigration flow in the 1970s and 17
percent of the immigrant flow during the 1980s, it is possible that some of the trends observed
across cohoris in the past twenty years can be directly attributable to the relative growth in the
number of refugee households.' rt is important, therefore, to determine if the same trends are
observed among non-refUgee immigrant households.
Unfortunately, the U.S. Census does not contain any information on the type of visa used
by a particular household to enter the United States. To approximate the refugee population,
therefore, I classify jj households who originate in the main refUgee-sending countries as refugees
(all other households are classified as non-refUgees). A refUgee-sending country is defined as one
'Thesepercentagesare obtained by dividing the number of refugees granted permanent residence by the
totalsize of the immigrant flow, where thedenominatorexcludes the population of illegal aliens "ho
receivedamnesty (andwho weregrantedpermanentresidencestatus) in 1989 and 1990.S
where more than 1,000 reftigees originated between 1981 and 1990, and where the refugee flow
was responsible foratleast 40 percent of the total immigrant flow (from that country) during the
decade.' Thirteen countries satis& these restrictions: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Hungary, Laos, Poland, Rornania, Thailand, the former USSR., and
Vietnam.8 These thirteen countries accounted for 90.4 percent of the refustecs awarded
permanent residence status during the 1970s, and for 90.5 percent in the 1980s.
Table 3 illustrates the trends in immigrant participation rates for non-refugee and refugee
households, and these trends show that both types of immigrants are now more likely to be
enrolled in welfare programs. In 1970, 5.6 percent ofnon-refiigee households received public
assistance as opposed to 7.1 percent of refugee households.. By 1990, non-refUgee households
had a welfare participation rate of 7.8 percent, as opposed to 16.1 percent for refugee households,
The table also indicates that the increasing participation in welfare programs of non-refugee
households can be attributed to both cohort effects and to assimilation effects, although the
cohort effects were very weak during the 1980s. For example, the welfare participation rate of
7The dataonthe number of refugee entrants is obtained from U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service (1992, p. 84). It is '-orth noting that the INS data on the number of rcfutecs refers to refugees
granted permanent residence status during the decade. Some refugees who entered the United States
between 1981 and 1990 will not adjust status until after 1991, and hence they are not inctuded in the
total count of refugees.
8The immigrant flow from Poland does not strictly satisfy these restrictions because only about 35
percent of the 1980s Polish flow entered the United States using a refugee "isa. I include it as one of the
13 countries because of the relatively large size of its refugee how (33.9 thousand immigranis. and
because Poland was an important source of refugees throughout much ol the posiwar period,
9Obviously, this construction of a refugee sample is, to some extent, arbitran'. For instance, the list of
refugee-sending countries could conceivably include Iran (which was the source of 46.8 thousand
refugees during the 1980s. although refugees accounted for only 30 percent of the total Iranian flow). I
experimented with a number of alternative definitions of the refugee sample, and the results were
essenuially the same as those reported below because the refugee data is dominated by a small set of
countries, such as Cambodia, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam.TABLE 3
WELFARE PARTICIPATION RATES OF IMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS, 1970-1990,
BY REFUGEE STATUS
Grout, Non-RefijgeeHouseholds Refugee Households
A92Q12Q 2P 122Q P 122P
AllImmigrants 5.6 8.2 7.8 7.1 11,6 16.1
Cohort:
1985-1939 Arrivals --- --- 5.3 --- 30.5
1980-1984Arrivals --- --- 7.4 --- 25.9
1975-1979 Arrivals --- 5.6 8.6 --- 23.6 18.5
1970-1974 Arrivals --- 7.5 9.2 --- 15.9 14.9
1965-1969 Arrivals 3.3 8.8 9.1 16.7 16.9 13.9
1960-1964 Arrivals 4.7 8.4 8.2 13.1 12.1 9.6
1950-1959Arrivals 4.7 7.1 6.8 5.5 7.2 8.2
Pre-1950Arrivals 6.4 9.7 8.4 5.5 7.4 6.6
Sample Size:
Immigrants 67,767 248,515 303,489 18.43449,53053.805
Note: Refugee households are households originating in Afghanistan. Bulgaria, Cambodia. Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
Ethiopia, Hungary, Laos, Poland, Romania, Thailand, the U.S.S.R.. and Vietnam.9
non-refugee households who have been in the country fewer than five years was 3.3 percent in
1970, 5.6 percent in 1980, and 5.3 percent in 1990.
In contrast, much of the rise in welfare participation rates exhibited by refugees in the past
twenty years can be attributed to sizable cohort effects: About 17 percent of the newly-arrived
refugees in the 1970 Census received public assistance; by 1990, 30.5 percent of the newly-
arrived immigrants received public assistance. The data also indicate that the welfare panicipation
rate of refugeehouseholdsdoes not seem to rise over time. There seems to be, in fact, a slight
decline in welfare recipiency rates as the refugee population ages. For example, 23.6 percent of
refugee households admitted in the late 1970s received public assistance in 1980; by 1990. the
welfare participation rate of this cohort had fallen to 18.5 percent. It is important to point out,
however, that even after 20 years in the United States refugee households are much more likely to
receive public assistance than either natives or non-refugee immigrants.
The Census data provide striking evidence that not only are the recipiency rates of
immigrant households rising over time, but also that the dollar costs of immigrant welfare
participation are rising even faster. Table 4 documents that the typical native household on
welfare received roughly $4,000 in cash benefits (in 1989 dollars) in all three Census years under
study. In contrast, the typical immigrant household on welfare received about $3,800 in 1970.
nearly $4,700 in 1980, and about $5,400 in 1990. The table also reveals sizable cohon effects in
the welfare income received by immigrant households. In 1970, households who had just entered
the country and were on welfare received an average of $3,800 in cash benefits. By 1990, the
newly-arrived immigrant households on welfare received an average of 56,400.10
'°Although the trends in public assistance incomes received by immigrant households across Censuses
can be meaningfully interpreted in terms of cohort effects, some caution is required when using the dataTABLE 4
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Note: Mean incomesarecalculaled in subsample of housciiolds that receive public assistanct10
Table 4 also reveals a growing gap in the average public assistance income received by
reftigee and non-refugee households on welfare, with refugee households receiving substantially
higher levels of cash benefits by 1990. In 1970, the typical non-refugee household on welfare
received about $300 rnr than the typical refugee household on welfare. By 1990, the typical
non-refugee household on welfare received about $2,200 less per year than the typical refugee
household on welfare
To complete the descriptive analysis, it is instructive to track a specific immigrant cohort,
defined in terms of both year-of-migration j4 age-at-arrival, across the various Censuses. As
noted by Friedberg (1992) and Smith (1992), the intercensal comparison of a sample of
immigrants aged 18+ is contaminated by the fact that later Censuses include a number of persons
who migrated as children. It is likely that immigrant children did not experience the same process
of labor market adaptation (or introduction into welfare programs) as adult immigrants. For
example, if immigrant children are more like natives in terms of their welfare propensities, then the
results summarized in Table I understate the extent of immigrant assimilation i.nm welfare
programs. Therefore, a better description of the assimilation experience of immigrants is obtained
by controlling for age-at-migration.
Table 5 summarizes the empirical evidence, It is evident that tracking specific age groups
across Censuses reveals the existence of sizable assimilation effects into welfare both in the entire
immigrant population, as well as among non-refugees. Consider, for examp!e. the sample of non-
refugee households who arrived between 1965 and 1969 and who were 18-34 years old in 1970
(so that most persons in the sample migrated as young adults). This group olimmisrant
to calculate (lie assimilation effects. The households obsen'ed receiving welfare from a specific cohort
in the 1970 Census need not be the same households that receive welfare in eithcr the 1930 or 1990TABLE 5.ThEIMPACT OF AGING ON WELFARE PARTICIPATION RATES
Cohort AgeGroup 1970 1980 1990
Natives: 18-34 in 1970 5.1 6.4 5.6
35-49 in 1910 4.5 7.2 81
18-34 in 1980 — 6.7 6.2
35-49 in 1980 — 6.7 6.2
Immigrants: 1950-59 Arrivals: 18-34 in 1970 4.5 5.7 48
35-49 in 1970 4.1 6.2 7.2
Immigrants: 1960-64 Arrivals: 18-34 in 1970 4.2 7.3 6.5
35-49 in 1970 5.5 8.8 10.4
18-34 in 1980 — 6.7 5.7
35-49 in 1980 — 7.7 6.9
Immigrants: 1965-69 Arrivals: 18-34 in 1970 3.2 7.4 8.2
35—49 in 1970 5.7 10.1 11.7
18-34 in 1980 — 7.6 8.0
35-49 in 1980 — 8.0 8.1
Immigrants: 1970-74 Arrivnls: 18-34 in 1980 6.2 8.1
3549 in 1980 7.2 3.5
Immigrants: 1975-79 Arrivals: 18-34 in 1980 5.3 7.3
35-49 in 1980 8.8 9,8
Non-Refugees: 1950-59 Arrivals: 18-34 in 1970 4.5 5.8 4.9
35-49 in 1970 4.0 6.1 7.1
Non-Refugees: 1960-64 Arrivals: 18-34 in 1970 3.6 7,2 6.6
35—19 in 1970 3.8 7.7 10.1
18-34 in 1930 —- 7.2 6.!
35-49 in 1980 — 7.2 6.3
Non-Refugees: 1965-69 Arrivals: 18-34 in 1970 2.6 7.2 8.0
35-49 in 1970 3.1 8.7 10.9
18-34 in 1980 —- 7.7 3.2
35-49 in 1980 -— 7,5 7.6
Non-Refugees: 1970-74 Arrivals: 18-34 in 1980 6.2 8.2
3549 in 1980 6.7 3.0
Non-Refugees: 1975-79 Arrivals: 18-34 in 1980 4.2 7,0
35-49 in 1980 5.5 8.4
Refugees: 1950-59 Arrivals: 18-34 in 1970 4.5 5.5 3.4
35-49 in 1970 4.4 6,4 7.2
Refugees: 1960-64 Arrivals: 18-34 in 1970 7.7 7.9 5.9
3549 in 1970 11.6 12.9 11.3
18-34 in 1980 -— 4,5 3.8
3549 in 1980 — 11.2 7.4
Refugees: 1965-69 Arrivals: 18-34 in 1970 9.3 9.4 10.0
35-49 in 1970 15.2 15.1 14.4
18-34 in 1930 --- 6.2 5.9
35-49 in 1930 -— 11.9 11.6
Refugees: 1970-74 Arrivals: 18-34 in 1980 6.8 6,7
35-49 in 1980 11.8 12.5
Refugees:1975-79Arrivals: 18-34 in 1980 18.1 14.0
3549 in 1980 23.6 16.111
households had an initial welfare participation rate of2.6 percent (much less than that of similarly-
aged natives). By 1980. the participation rate had rise to 7.4 percent, and by 1990 to 8.0 percent
(or about 2.4 percentage points above that of comparable natives). Similarly, non-refIjczee
households who arrived between 1965 and 1969 and were 35-49 in 1970 (so that they migrated as
prime-age adults) have an initial welfare participation rate of 3.1 percent, which increases to 10.9
percent by 1990. During a twenty-year period, therefore, the participation rate of non-reftigees
increases by about 5 percentage points relative to that of native households.
The table also indicates that refligee households do j move out of the welfare system
once we control for age-at-migration. For example, among refugee households who arrived in the
United States between 1965 and 1969 and who were aged 35-49 in 1970, the participation
probability fell from 15.2 to only 14.4 percent between 1970 and 1990. Similarly, the refugees
who entered the United States between 1960 and 1964 and who were aged 35-49 in 1970
experienced a decline in the participation probability from 11.6 percent to 11.3 percent during the
20-year period.
The descriptive data in Table 5, therefore, clearly indicate that the typical non-refugee
immigrant assimilates jj welfare, while the typical refUgee immigrant has a high welfare
participation probability throughout the life cycle. Boijas and Trejo (1991) conjectured that the
assimilation into welfare programs by non-refugees might arise because newly-arrived immigrants
fear that they jeopardize their chances for naturalization (and thus for sponsorship of family
members residing abroad under the family preference system) if they receive public assistance. To
the extent that this type of behavior occurs, the data should reveal discrete jumps in welFare
Censuses.12
participation rates after the household has resided in the United States for five years (i.e., the
length of residency required for naturalization).
However, the tracking of specific immigrant cohorts over a 20-year period reveals that, in
many cases, the assimilation of immigrants into welfare programs continues even after the
household has resided in the United States for ten vears It is unlikely, therefore, that the
incentives provided by naturalization explains the assimilation effect. It is also unlikely that the
data can be explained in terms of the immigrant household gaining information about the welfare
system; after all, most of that information can surely be gathered during the household's first
decade in the United States. The perverse assimilation effects influencing immigrant participation
in welfare programs, therefore, remain unexplained and will surely be the focus of much additional
research.
III. Rearession Analysis
Although the descriptive statistics in the previous section clearly illustrate the trends in
welfare participation in the immigrant population, it is important to ascertain if immigrant
households, for given characteristics, are more "prone" to enter the welfare system. I address this
question by estimating the following regression model in each of the Census cross-sections:
(I) P—XJ3+öI,+c,
whereP,isa dummy variable set to unity if household i receives public assistance .k, is a vector
of background socioeconomic characteristics; and 4 is a dummy variable set to unity if the
household head is foreign-born. Because of the very large samples available in my Census13
extracts (nearly 1.3 million households in the three Censuses). I estimate equation (1) using the
linear probability model. I estimated the same model using maximum likelihood probit on random
samples of the data, and obtained virtually identical results. Table 6 reports the coefficient of the
immigrant dummy estimated in each Census for several specifications of the vector X.
The first column of the table reports the raw difference in the probability of welfare
participation between immigrant and native households in each of the Censuses (i.e., the vectorX
contains only an intercept). Column 2 adds the gender and the age of the household head (where
age is entered as a fourth-order polynomial) to the list of regressors. It is evident that differences
in the gender or the age of the household head do not LIexplain the differences between
immigrant and native households. In 1990, immigrant households still have a substantially higher
probability of receiving public assistance. The third column adds the educational attainment of the
household head to the regression. The addition of this variable greatly reduces the gap in welfare
participation propensities between immigrant and native households, In the 1970 and I 9S0
Censuses, immigrants are now less likely to receive public assistance than native households,
while in the 1990 Census, immigrant households are only slightly more likely to be on welfare
than similarly-educated native households. Therefore, an important reason for the relatively
higher welfare participation rate of recent immigrants is the lower educational attainment of
immigrant households.''
Column 4 of the table adds three variables describing the household's composition: the
number of persons residing in the household, the number of persons under age 18, and the number
Ilj also estimated equation (1) by using a vector orvariables indicating the year of migration to the
United States rather than a single immigrantdummy.This analysis led to a similar qualitative
conclusion: the differences in welfare participation between native and immigrant households are
entirely "explaineC by differences in socioeconomic characteristics among the groups.TABLE 6
STANDARDIZED DIFFERENCES IN WELFARE PARTICIPATION PROBABILITy
BETWEEN IMMIGRMIT AND NATIVE HOUSEHOLDS
Regression
1ff! LU U) (4) W SrnpIeSize
1970 -.0007 -.0131 -.0248 -.0243 -.0239 145.159
(.0025) (.0025) (.0024) (.0024) (.0025)
1980 .0086 .0054 -.0088 -.0140 -.0255 370,778
(.0017) (.0017) (.0016) (.0016) (.0017)
1990 .0170 .0214 .0073 -.0027 -.0151 780,727
(.0006) (.0006) (.0006) (.0006) (.0007)
VariablesHeld None Includes Adds Adds NumberAdds Race
Constant GenderandEducation ofof Personsin Dummies





Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.14
of persons over age 65. The results are striking. After controlling for these household
characteristics, immigrant households become less likely to participate in public assistance
programs than native households. Moreover, adding a vector of race dummies (black, Hispanic,
or Asian) in column 5 reduces the coefficient of the immigrant dummy even further. Within race
groups, therefore, immigrants are much less likely to receive public assistance than natives.
In view of the ongoing debate over the impact of immigration on welfare expenditures, the
empirical evidence summarized in Table 6 should be interpreted with caution. The evidence does
not say that immigrants are less likely to receive welfare. Rather, the evidence indicates that
immigrants who have the same characteristics as natives are less likely to receive welfare. But
because immigrants, on average, have less favorable socioeconomic characteristics, they also have
higher welfare participation rates. Put differently, it is not "immigrant-ness" per se that leads to
high welfare propensities; it is the characteristics of the immigrants currently entering the United
States.
To summarize the trends between 1970 and 1990, I pool the data from all three decennial
Censuses, and estimate the following regression model that allows for aging, period, and cohort
effects;'2
(2) = x,e+oi,+ay,+l3,C ÷y D,.,0 4Yo+6,,
'2The identification of aging, period, and cohort effects is achieved by assuming that the coellicicnts of
the period effects y and y are the same forimmigrantsand natives.15
where, as before, P,isa dummy variable set to unity if household ireceivespublic assistance; 21, is
a vector of socioeconomic variables which includes a fourth-order polynomial in the age of the
household head; I,isa dummy variable set to unity if the household head is foreign-born;y, gives
the number of years that the immigrant household has resided in the United States and is
introduced as a fourth-order polynomial (y takes on the value of zero for native households); Cis
a vector of dummy variables indicating the calendar year in which the migration occurred (the
variables in the vector indicate if the household migrated in 1980-84, 1975-79 1970-74; 1965-69;
1960-64; 1950-59; and prior to 1950); and the dummy variables D180andD190indicateif the
observation was drawn from the 1980 or the 1990 Census, respectively.
Because the age of the household is held constant in the vector X, the coefficient a
measures the aging or assimilation effect (i.e., the rate at which the immigrant and native welfare
participation probabilities converge or diverge over time). The coefficient vector Isummarizes
the cohort effects (i.e., how the probability of welfare participation at the time of entry differs
across cohorts). Finally, the coefficient vector y gives the period effects.
The first two columns of Table 7 report the estimates of the regression model in equation
(2). The first column includes only the age and gender of the household head in the vector X,
while the second column adds other background characteristics, including the educational
attainment of the household head and variables describing the household's composition (see the
notes to the table for a list of these control variables). For convenience, the table only repons the
linear and quadratic coefficients of age and years-since-migration (even though both of these
variables are introduced as fourth-order polynomials).
In view of the trends revealed by the descriptive statistics summarized in the previous
section, the regression results are not surprising. There are sizable cohort effects, with moreTABLE 7. REGRESSIONUSING POOLED 1970, 1980, AND1990 CENSUSES
Regression
All Immigrants Non-Refugees Refugees
Variable LU U) Li) U)
FemaleHead of .0893 .0946 .0887 .0923 .0928 .0957
Household (=1) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0006) (.0007) (.0007)
Age .0057 -.0417 .0056 -.0367 -.0007 -.0442
(.0011) (.0012) (.0012) (.0013) (.0016) (.0017)
Age2 -.0003 .0012 -.0003 .0011 -.0001 .0013
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0001)
ImmigrantI) .0225 -.0005 -.0157 -.0317 .2587 .2125
(.0021) (.0021) (.0023) (.0023) (.0062) (.0060)
1980-1984 .0111 .0112 .0016 .0020 -.0168 -.0131
Arrivals (.0025) (.0025) (.0027) (.0026) (.0083) (.0080)
1975-1979 -.0042 .0019 .0025 .0080 -.0793 -.0570
Arrivals (.0030) (.0029) (.0032) (.003)) (.0102) (.0099)
1970-1974 -.0.145 -.0080 -.0002 .0029 -.1158 -.0689
Arrivals (.0034) (.0033) (.0037) (.0036) (.0120) (.0116)
1965-1969 -.0199 .0020 -.0080 .0082 -.1209 -.0741
Arrivals (.0038) (.0037) (.0042) (.0040) (.0130) (.0126)
1960-1964 -.0355 .0029 -.0203 .0104 -.1563 -.0999
Arrivals (.0042) (.0041) (.0047) (.0046) (.0143) (.0139)
1950-1959 -.0542 -.0088 -.0352 .0055 -.1858 -.1405
Arrivals (.0047) (.0046) (.0053) (.0051) (.0157) (.0153)
Pre-1950 -.0577 -.0142 -.0355 .0017 -.2023 -.1473
Arrivals (.0062) (.0061) (.0070) (.0068) (.0204) (.0197)
Years-Since- .0026 -.0044 .0049 -.0027 -.0065 -.0138
Migration (.0008) (.0007) (.0008) (.0008) (.0025) (.0024)
(Years-Since- .oooo .0003 -.0001 .0003 .0002 .0007
Migration)2 (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (.0002)
1980 Period .0122 .0313 .0122 .0302 .0119 .0360
Effect (.0008) (.0008) (.0009) (.0008) (.001!) (.0012)
1990 Period .002 I .0317 .0024 .0301 .0024 .0392
Effect (.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0011) (.00 10)
Intercept -.0121 .5604 -.0018 .5112 .0732 .6189
(.0130) (.0136) (.0133) (.0140) (.0181) (.0190)
.030 .038 .029 .033 .046 .1)6
Includes Demographic No Yes No Yes No Yes
Characteristics
Notes:Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All the regressions also include cubic and quarticpolynomials
in age and year-of-migration. ilie regressionsin columns (1)and (2) have 1.296,664 observations: those in
columns(3) and (4)have1.174.8% observations: and those in columns (5) and (6) have 676.903 observations.
The demographic characteristics held constant in columns (2), (4),and(6) include education of head. the numbcr ofpersonsin the household, the number of persons under the age of 18 and over the age of 65. and a vector of race
dummies.16
recent cohorts having higher welfare participation rates than earlier cohorts (the exception being
the 1980-1984 cohort, which has the highest entry participation probability of any cohort in the
data). For the most part, the regressions also suggest that immigrants experience strong
assimilation effects into welfare: the probability of participating in the welfare system increases
substantially over time for a particular cohort.'3
The implications of the estimated regressions are easy to grasp if I use the coefficients
reported in column I of Table 7 to predict the differences in welfare participation rates between
immigrant and native households over the life cycle. To conduct this simulation, I assume that
immigrants arrive in the United States at age 20 (so that years-since-migration equals zero at age
20, one at age 21, and so on).'4 The predicted life-cycle profiles for the difference in welfare
participation rates between selected immigrant cohorts and natives is illustrated in the top panel of
Figure 1. The graph clearly illustrates that the assimilation effects into welfare are substantial,
increasing the welfare participation of a particular immigrant cohort, relative to natives, by about
3 percentage points over a twenty year period (from ages 20 to 40).
As documented in the previous section, non-refugees and refugees have very different life
cycle trends in welfare participation. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 report the regressions which
'flie regression reported in column 2 makes it seem as immigrant households assimilate cut of weIf:ire.
In particular, the coefficient of the linear years-since-migration variable turns negative. whilc the
quadratic term turns positive. Recall, however, that the regressions also include cubic and quartic terms
in years-since-migration. Alter accounting for these higher-order terms, it turns out that thc regression
still implies that immigrants assimilate into welfare (although the assimilation rate is much smaller than
in column 1). To see this result easily, note that if I estimate the regression using only a second-order
polynomial, the linear coefficient of years-since-migration is 0003 (with a standard en-or of 0002).
while the quadratic term is -.00001 (.0000!). Much of the movement of immigrants into welfare
programs as they age, therefore, seems to be explained by changes in socioeconomic characteristics.
l4j also let the variable describing the gender of the household head take on a value of .281. because
28.1 percent of all immigrant households in the 1990 Census are female-headed. Finally, the exercise
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comparenative households to non-reftagee immigrant households, while columns S and 6 of the
table report the equivalent regressions comparing native and refugee households. The middleand
bottom panels of Figure 1 illustrate the implications of the regressions in columns 3 and 5 forthe
life cycle trends in welfare participation.
It is evident that more recent non-refugee households are more like!)' toparticipate in
welfareprograms(particularly in comparison to pre-1970 immigrants), and that over a twenty-
yearperiod, theprobability that a typical non-refi.igee household receives public assistance
increases byabout5percentagepoints. Asaresult, all the post-1965 non-refugee immigrant
waves eventually have higher welfare participation rates than natives. The graph also illustrates
that refugees tend to "assimilate" out of welfare. However, the refugee welfare participationrate
(relative to natives) declines by only 5percentagepoints over a twenty year period, so that the
predicted welfare participation rate of the 1965-1969 wave is 7 percentage points higher than that
of natives even after 20 years in the United States.
As noted earlier, the process of immigrant assimilation into (or out of) welfare is better
captured when the analysis controls for age-at-migration. The expanded regression model is
given by:
(3)
whereA, is the age-at-migration of the household head (Aisset to zero for native-born
households). It is important to note that the impact of age-at-migration on welfare propensities is
identified because the coefficient of the variable giving the householder'sage. which is one of the
variables in the vectorX, is restricted to be the same for both native and immigrant households. It18
is this restriction that allows the estimation of equation (3), despite the fact that .4, = (Age -y) for
immigrant households. Table 8 reports the regression for the pooled sample of immigrants and
for non-refugee and refugee households, respectively. The life-cycle implications of the
regressions in columns 1, 3, and 5 are illustrated in Figure 2 (again assuming that the immigrant
household arrives in the United States at age 20).
The regressions indicate that age-at-migration has a strong positive impact on welfare
propensities: immigrants who migrate at older ages are much more likely to participate in welfare
programs. Holding all other factors constant, an immigrant who enters the United States at age
20, for example, is 2.4 percentage point more likely to be on welfare than an immigrant who
enters the United States at the age of 10. This is not surprising because immigrants who migrate
as children go through an extensive period of assimilation prior to entering the labor market. It is
also likely that younger immigrants (say those who migrate in their 20s and 30s) are much more
adaptable than older immigrants.
The regressions also show that adding age-at-migration as a control variable barely affects
the coefficients measuring the magnitude of the cohort effects. The inclusion of age-at-migration
in the model, however, does affect the coefficients of the variables measuring the extent of
immigrant assimilation into welfare programs. In particular, controlling for age-at-migration
intensifies the assimilation of non-refugees into welfare programs, and weakens the assimila:ion of
refugees out of welfare programs. As shown in Figure 2, the welfare participation probability of a
non-refugee household increases by almost 7 percentage points relative to that of natives over a
20-year period, as opposed to the 5 percentage point rise documented when the regression did not
control for age-at-migration. Among refugee households, adding age-at-migration to the
regression flattens the life cycle profile of immigrant welfare participation relative to that ofTABLE 8. REGRESSION USINGPOOLED1970,1980. AND1990CENSUSES.INCLUDING AGE-AT- MIGRATION
Regression
All Immigrants Non-Refugees Refu2ees Variable UI £2) w £2.)
FemaleHead of .0397 .0948 .0888 .0924 .0933 .0960 Household (=1) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (.0006) (.0007) (.0007)
Age .0106 -.0377 .0089 -.0343 .0023 -0412
(.0011) (.0012) (.0012) (.0013) (.0016) (.0017)
Age2 -.0004 .0011 -.0004 .0010 -.0002 .0012
(.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0001)
Immigrant&I) -.0685 -.0205 -.0780 -.0819 .0862 0459
(.0025) (.0025) (.0027) (.0027) (.0070) (.0069)
1980-1984 .0104 .0105 .0011 .0016 -.0119 -0089 Arrivals (.0025) (.0025) (.0027) (.0026) (.0083) (.0080)
1975-1979 -.0056 .0006 .0013
..0069 -.0766 -.0568 Arrivals (0030) (.0029) (.0032) (.0031) (.0102) (.0099)
1970-1974 . -.0165 -.0102 -.0018 .0016 -.1261 -.0737 Arrivals (.0034) (.0033) (.0037) (.0036) (.0 120) (.0116)
1965-1969 -.0229 -.0014 -.0097 .0064 -.1311 -.0773 Arrivals (.0038) (.0037) (.0041) (.0040) (.0130) (.0126)
1960-1964 -.0373 .0002 -.0211 .0092 -.1588 -.0955 Arrivals (.0042) (.004!) (.0047) (.0046) (.0142) (.0139)
1950-1959 -.0583 -.0137 -.0372 .0029 -.2013 -.1483
Arrivals (.0047) (.0046) (.0053) (.0051) (.0157) (.0153)
Pre-1950 -.0760 -.0318 -.0433 -.0098 -.2358 -.1715
Arrivals
(.0062) (.0061) (.0070) (.0068) (.0203) (.0197)
Years-Since- .0048 -.0024 .0064 -.0015 -.0032 -.0111
Migration (.0008) (.0007) (.0008) (.0008) (.0025) (.0024)
(Years-Since- -.0001 .0003 -.0002 .0003 .0002 .0008
Migration)2 (.000!) (.000!) (.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (.0002)
Age-At- .0024 .0022 .0017 .0014 .0042 .0040
Migration (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0001) (.0001)
1980Period .0115 .0306 .0117 .0298 .0116 .0354 Effect (.0008) (.0008) (.0009) (0®S) (.0012) (.0017)
1990 Period .002! .0315 .0024 .0305 .0023 .0586 Effect (.0003) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0010) (.0010)
Intercept -.0449 5334 -.0241 .4957 .0463 .5910
(.0129) (.0136) (.0133) (.0140) (.0181) (.0190)
R2 .034 .091 .031 .086 .050 .119
Includes Demographic No Yes No Yes No Yes Characteristics
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All the regressions also include cubic andquarlic Po!nonials in age and year-of-migration. The regressions in columns (1) and (2) haveL296,664 observations: those in
columns (3) and (4) have 1.174,896 observations; and those in columns (5) and (6) have676.903 observations.
The demographic characteristics held constant in columns (2). (4), and (6) include education ofhead, the number















Figure 2. Difference in Welfare Participation Rate Between Immigrants and Natives Over the Life
Cycle, Controlling for Age-At-Migration
1985-89 Cohort
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natives, so that the welfare participationrates of reftigees remain constant at very high levels over
muchof the life cycle.
IV.DoTmnliRrants Pay Their Way?
The current debate over immigration policy seems to be dominated by the question of
whether immigrants "pay their way" in the welfare state. As with all accounting exercises, this
one is fraught with questionable assumptions which effectively determine the answer to the
question. Passel and Clark (1994), for example, find that immigrants pay over $27 billion more in
taxes than they took out of the welfare and schooling systems, while Huddle (1993) concludes
that the net costs of immigration exceeded $40 billion in 1992."
Regardless of which calculation one wishes to believe, there are some facts about the costs
of immigrant participation in welfare programs that are indisputable and that do not depend on
accounting assumptions. Table 9 summarizes the relevant data for the 1970-1990 period. The
first row of the table reports the fraction of households in the United States that have an
immigrant head. This fraction rose from 6.8 percent in 1970, to 7.6 percent in 1980. and to 8.4
percent in 1990. Using the summary statistics reported in Section II, it is easy to calculate the
fraction of immigrant households in the population of "welfare households" (i.e., households that
receive public assistance). In 1970, 6.7 percent of welfare households had an immigrant head, so
that immigrants were slightly under-represented among welfare households. By 1990, the
situation had changed dramatically: 10.1 percent of welfare households had a foreign-born head,
so that immigrants were substantially over-represented among welfare households.
t5Othcr accounting exercises include North (1933) and ParkerandRca (1993). A critical survey of the
literature is given by Rothman and Espenshade (1993).TABLE 9
IMMIGRANT CONTRIBUTION TO WELFARE EXPENDITURES
1970 1980 1990
AllImmlgranti:
1. Percent of Households withImmigrantHeads 6.8 7.6 8.4
2.Percent of Households with Immigrant Heads in 6.7 8.3 10.1
Population of Households Receiving Public Assistance
3.Percentof Public Assistance IncomeDistributedto 6.7 9.1 13.1
Householdswith Immigrant Heads
4. Percent of Non-Welfare Income Received by Households 6.3 7.0 8.3
with Immigrant Heads
Non-Refugees:
1.Percent of Households with Immigrant Heads 5.4 6.3 7.1
2.Percent of Households with Immigrant Heads in 5.0 6.5 7.4
Population of Households Receiving Public Assistance
3. Percent of Public Assistance Income Distributed to 5.1 7.0 8.5
Households with Immigrant Heads
4. Percent of Non-Welfare Income Received by Households 4.9 5.9 7.2
with Immigrant Heads
Refugees:
1.Percent of Households with Immigrant Heads 1.5 1.3 1.3
2. Percent of Households with Immigrant Heads in 1.7 1.8 2.7
Population of Households Receiving Public Assistance
3. Percent of Public Assistance Income Distributed to 1.6 2.1
Households with Immigrant Heads
4. Percent of Non-Welfare Income Received by Households 1.3 1.! 1.2
with Immigrant Heads
Non-Refugee,Non-Mexican:
t.Percent of Households with Immigrant Heads 4.9 5.3 5.6
2. Percent of Households with Immigrant Heads in 3.9 4.9 5.1
Population of Households Receiving Public Assistance
3. Percent of Public Assistance Income Distributed to 3.8 6.0
Households with Immigrant Heads
4. Percent olNon-Welfare Income Received by Households 4.6 5.1 6.1
with Immigrant Heads20
Using the data on the number of households receiving public assistance as well as on the
average benefits received by these households, it is possible to calculate the total amount of public
assistance reported by households. In 1970, a total of$14.6 billion was distributed to households;
by 1980. this expenditure had risen to $26.8 billion; and by 1990, to $28.6 billion. The third row
of Table 9 reports the fraction of "welfare income" that was distributed to foreitzn-born
households. In 1970, 6.7 percent of cash benefits were distributed to immigrant households.
again indicating that immigrant were slightly under-represented in the distribution of welfare
benefits. By 1990, the situation had changed drastically: 13.1 percent of all cash benefits were
distributed to immigrant households, indicating a substantial over-representation of immigrants in
welfare expenditures. Put differently, the total amount of cash benefits received by immigrant
households was 56 percent higher than would have been the case if immigrants used the welfare
system to the same extent (both in terms of participation rates and per-household beneflt levels) as
natives.
It is evidently clear, therefore, that immigrants are now receiving a disproportionately high
share of welfare benefits (at least in terms of the cash benefits programs reported in Census data).
Moreover, the evidence also indicates that immigrants do not receive a disproportionately high
share of non-welfare income. In each decennial Census, I calculated the non-welfare income of
households (defined as the total income from all sources minus public assistance income), and
then calculated the fraction of such income that is received by immigrant households. The fourth
row of Table 9 reports this statistic. In 1970, immigrants received approximately 6.3 percent of
all non-welfare income (slightly less than their population proportion). By 1990, immigrants21
received 8.3 percent of all nan-welfare income (about the same as their population proportion))6
Because immigrants do not receive a disproportionately high share of income, they also do not
pay a disproportionately high share of taxes. The relatively high use of cash benefits programs by
immigrants, therefore, suggests that the immigrant population does not pay its way in the welfare
state.
The next two panels of Table 9 reestirnate the various statistics for the population of non-
refugee and reftigee immigrants, respectively. The data indicate that both immigrant groups
receive a disproportionately large share of welfare expenditures. In 1990. for example, non-
refugee immigrants made up 7.1 percent of all households in the United States, but these
households received 8.5 percent of all cash benefits distributed. Similarly, refugee immigrants
made up only 1.3 percent of households in the United States, but received 4.6 percent of all cash
benefits distributed.
Finally, the bottom panel of Table 9 reestimates the various statistics for the sample of
non-refugee, non-Mexican immigrants. It is sometimes argued that the adverse impact of
immigration on welfare costs arises because of the problems associated with the refugee
population, as well as because of the very large number of unskilled Mexicans who have migrated
to the United States (both legally and illegally). The data in Table 9. however, indicate that the
welfare costs resulting from immigration have increased even in the "select" subsample of non-
refugee, non-Mexican immigrant households. In 1970, these immigrant households made up 4.9
percent of the population) but received only 3.8 percent of the cash benefits distributed. By 1990,
161t is interesting to note that immigrants, as a group, do not gct a disproportionately low share of non-
welfare income, even though the typical immigrant turns less than the typical native. This discrepancy
is explained by the fact that immigrants have larger labor force participation rates than natives.22
however, these immigrants made up 5.6 percent of the population and received 6.0 percent of the
cash benefits distributed. In other words, the welfare costs of immigration would have increased
even in the absence of the refugee and Mexican immigrant flows.
As noted earlier, accounting exercises which assign a dollar figure to the tax burden
imposed by immigration inevitably incorporate a number of hidden and questionable assumptions
Table 10 illustrates the problem by reporting a back-of-the-envelope calculation of thecosts and
benefits of immigration. The first row reports that immigrants received $3.7 billion dollars in cash
welfare benefitsin1990, or as noted earlier, 13.1 percent of all expenditures in cash benefit
programs. At that time, expenditures on means-tested entitlement programs was $181.3 (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1992, p. 357))7 Ifwe assume that immigrants received a 13.1percent
share of these expenditures, immigrants then accounted for $23.8 billion of expenditures in all
means-tested entitlement programs.
The next step in the calculation is to compute the taxes that immigrantspay, According to
the 1990 Census data, immigrant households earned a total income (net of welfare payments) of
$284.7 billion. There are no nationwide estimates of the total tax burden (i.e.. one that includes
federal, state, and local taxes) faced by the immigrant population. Table 10 provides estimates of
total taxes using three alternative tax rates: 20, 30, and 40 percent.
If the tax rate were 30 percent, for example, immigrant householdspay about S85.4 billion
in taxes. The calculations thus indicate that immigrants pay more in taxes (585.4 billion) than they
take out of the system ($23.8 billion). But this comparison is misleading. It is, in effect, saying
'7Actually, expenditures on means-tested entitlement programs totaled $186.4 billion, The figure
reported in the text nets out expenditures on Indian Health Services and on pensions for needy veterans
from the total because few immigrants are likely to qualifyforthese programs.TABLE 10
ACCOUNTING OF WELFARE EXPENDITURES AND TAXES PAID
BY IMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS IN 1990
(In Billionsof Dollars)
TaxRate
1.Cash Benefits Received by Immigrant $3.7 $3.7 $3.7
Households ( 698.071 Households x $5,363)
2. Dollar Value of Benefits from Means-Tested $23.8 $23.8 $23.8
Programs Received by Immigrant Households
(13.1% of$I81.3 Billion)
3. Non-Welfare Income Received by Immigrant $284.7 $284.7 5284.7
Households
4. Taxes Paid by Immigrant Households $56.9 $85.4 S 113.9
5. Taxes Allocated to Means-Tested Entitlement $5.1 $7.6 SI 0.1
Programs (8.9% of Taxes Paid)
6. Fiscal Burden on Native Taxpayers Imposed by $18.7 $16.2 513.7
Immigrant Households23
thatimmigrant taxes are only used to fund their use of entitlement programs. One can justi& this
assumption by arguing that all other government programs provide pure public goods, and that
expenditures in these programs would be the same whether or not we had immigration. It is
likely, however, that immigrants increase the congestion associated with the provision ofmany of
these public goods (e.g., more crowded parks, schools, jails, and roads). Therefore, themarginal
cost of providing these public goods to the immigrant population is not zero.
Obviously, different assumptions about the marginal cost of providing services will lead to
very different conclusions about whether immigrants pay their way in the welfare state. If the
marginal cost is zero, immigrants make a substantial contribution to the U.S. Treasury. If the
marginal cost equals the average cost, however, then immigrants should be charged for the costs
of the various government programs as if they were natives. In 1990, 91.1percent of taxes were
used to pay for programs other than means-tested entitlement programs.' If wecharge
immigrants 91.1 percent of their tax payments for using these other programs, then only 8.9
percent of immigrants' taxes are left to find their use of means-tested entitlement programs. As
reported in the fifth row of Table 10, immigrants would then contribute only $7.6 billion to the
funding of the entitlement programs. The tax burden resulting from immigration would then be
on the order of about $16 billion.
As this back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests, accounting exercises can lead to
radically different conclusions about whether immigrants pay their way. Because we do not have
any estimates of the impact that immigrants have on expenditures in a vast array of non-welfare
programs, accounting exercises which claim that immigration has a huge fiscal impact (either
'8ln 1989, total government expenditures totaled $2,031 billion, of which SI St.) billion (or 8.9percent)
were allocated to means-tested entitlement programs; see U.S.Bureauof the Census (1992). p. 357.24
positive or negative) should be interpreted with a great deal of caution. The data, however, do
unambiguously indicate that immigrants receive a disproportionately high share of welfare
benefits.
V. The California Experience
The recent California experience with immigrant participation in welfare programs
deserves separate study for a number of reasons. First, California is the destination of a large
number of legal immigrants: over one-third of legal immigrants declare that California is their
intended state of residence upon arriving to the United States (U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 1992, p. 61). Second, California is the destination of large numbers of
illegal aliens. Over half of the illegal aliens who were granted amnesty under the 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act live in California. Finally, California offers a very generous
menu of public assistance programs to its residents. In 1989, for example, the average cash grant
to an AFDC household was $642 per month in California. as compared to $383 nationwide (US.
Bureau of the Census, 1992, p. 371). In fact, California's average cash grant was the second
highest in the country (behind Alaska). In view of these trends, it is not surprising that much of
the current public debate over the economic impact of immigration today focuses on the
California experience.
Table II uses Census data to summarize the trends in welfare participation and benefit
levels of native and immigrant households in California between 1970 and 1990. The 1970
calculations are based on the 1/100 State File (5% questionnaire). The 1980 calculations use a
5/1000 random sample of native households, and a 5/100 sample of immigrant households, whileTABLE II
WELFARE PARTICIPATION BATES AND WELFARE INCOMES OF NATIVE
AND IMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS RESIDING IN CALIFORNIA, ] 970-1990
Sample Size:
7,461 68,439106,558 801 7.44912.937
Natives 5S.03336,41839,814 5.122 3.304 3.429







All Immigrants 10.7 10.9 12.0 4,3985.4507.276
Cohort:
1985-1989 Arrivals --- --- 12.5 --- ... 8.70!
1980-1984 Arrivals ---r 14.6 - 9,062
1975-1979 Arrivals --- 10.0 11.8 --- 6,0857,403
1970-1974 Arrivals --- 8.4 10.8 --- 5,9926,413
1965-1969 Arrivals 7.8 10.6 11.0 4,5266,1176,338
1960-1964 Arrivals 8.1 10.8 10.7 5,1815,9145,632
1950-1959 Arrivals 8.8 9.6 9.2 5,0635.2985,369
Pre-1950 Arrivals 13.0 14.4114 4,0574.5204,811
Immigrants25
the 1990 calculations use a 5/1000 random sample of native households, and a 5/100 sample of
immigrant households.
A number of results are immediately evident. Perhaps most striking is the fact that a
relatively large fraction of California's households, whether native- or foreign-born, received
public assistance. In 1990, for example, nearly 8.6 percent of native households residing in
California received public assistance, as compared to only 7.4 percent of native households
nationwide. Similarly, 12.0 percent of California's immigrant households received public
assistance, as compared to 9. 1 percent nationwide.
The trends in immigrant welfare participation rates in California mirror those documented
in earlier sections. In 1970, immigrant households in California were 1.9 percentage points more
likely than native households to receive public assistance; by 1990, the gap in welfare participation
rates between immigrant and native households had widened to 3.4 percentage points. This
increase can be explained in terms of both cohort and assimilation effects. The most recent
immigrant wave residing in California in 1970 had a welfare participation rate of 7.8 percent, as
compared to 12.5 percent for the most recent wave in 1990. Similarly, the welfare participation
rate of immigrant households that arrived in California between 1965 and 1969 rose from 7.8
percent to 11.0 percent between 1970 and 1990i
Table II also documents that not only is the propensity to go on welfare risinu rapidly
among California's immigrants, but that the dollar costs associated with this trend are rising even
faster The average payment to both native and immigrant welfare households in 1970 was about
t9sotnc caution is required when interpreting this fact as an assimilation cirect. The tracking of specific
waves of immigrants residing in a particular state across Censuses is contaminated by the interstate
migration of immigrant households, so that the sample composition will change over time.26
$4,400. By 1990, the typical immigrant household on welfare received approximately $1,500
more than the typical native household on welfare. Moreover, a newly-arrived immigrant
household on welfare in 1990 received $8,700 in cash benefits.
The current debate over immigrant participation in welfare programs in California focuses
on the welfare expenditures attributable to illegal aliens, and particularly to so-called citizen-
children (the U.S. born children of illegal aliens who are citizens and who qualify for social
services). However, illegal aliens are only part of the "welfare problem" attributable to
immigrants in California. Although the Census does not report whether a household is illegally
residing in the United States, the post-1965 (that is, post-Bracero program) trends in welfare
participation experienced by Mexican households and by non-Mexican, non-refugee households
are quite similar. Table 12 indicates that, if anything, recent Mexican immigrants have slightly
lower welfare participation rates than non-reftigee, non-Mexican households)° In contrast.
California's sizable refugee population (19.9 percent of all refugees reside in California) has
strikingly high welfare participation rates: about 50 percent of refugees who arrived during the
1980s are on welfare as of 1990.
The fiscal impact of the large number of immigrants enrolled in California's generous
welfare programs is summarized in Table 13. The first row of the table simply reports the fraction
of California's households that are headed by immigrants. This fraction has risen rapidly in recent
decades, from 11.4 percent in 1970 to 21.1 percent in 1990. The second row, however, indicates
20The table also illustrates a very interesting trend iii vetrarc participation among successive waves of
Mexican immigrants arriving in California. Pre-1950 arrivals, in particular, scent to have very high
rates of attachment to welfare programs. Galarza (1977) argued that the Bracero program displaced and
urbanized the niral Mexicans who had migrated to California prior 10 1950. This urbanization "shock."
as well as the economic txperiences olBracero immigrants after the program ended in 1964, might
explain many of the trends obsened in welfare participation among Mexican households in California.TABLE 12
TRENDSIN WELFARE PARTICIPATION RATES FOR MEXICAN, NON-REFUGEE
























1985-1989Arrivats --- 7.0 --- --- 7.8 --- --- 54.!
1980-1984 Arrivals--- --- 8.8 --- --- 8.6 --- --- 46.2
1975-1979 Arrivals--- 6.1 9.2 --- 7.010.0 ---34.0 26.9
1970-1974 Arrivals--- 7.5 10.1 --- 8.6 10.8 --- 15.2 18.5
1965-1969 Arrivals10.2 11.6 13.1 4.1 9.1 8.9 26.1 17.416.3
1960-1964 Arrivals12.6 15.1 16.5 5.5 8.0 7.2 11.2 14.0 13.5
1950-1959 Arrivals14.8 16.516.4 6,0 7.0 6.3 10.3 8.610.6
Pre-1950 Arrivals26.625.723.1 10.411.8 9.5 11.412.1 9.4
Sample Size l55521,34936,590 5,06241,09859,270 844 5,99210.698TABLE 13
CONTRIBUTION TO WELFARE EXPENDITURES BY IMMIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS
RESIDING IN CALIFORNIA
192Q
1.Percentof Households with 11.4 15.8 21.1
ImmigrantHeads
2. Percent of Households with Immigrant 13.5 18.4 270
Heads in Population of Households
Receiving Public Assistance
3. Percent of Public Assistance Income 13.5 19.3 320
Distributed toHouseholdswith
ImmigrantHeads
4. Percent of Non-Welfare Income 9.5 13.8 IS 2
Received by Households with
Immigrant Heads27
that the representation of immigrants among households receiving public assistance rose even
faster. In 1970, 13.5percentof the welfare households in California were foreign-born; in 1980 it
was 18.4 percent; and in 1990, it was 27.1 percent. Put differently, in 1970, immigrants were
only slightly over-represented in California's welfare population. By 1990, California's welfare
population is disproportionately foreign-born.
More importantly, because of the high level of benefits received by immigrant households
in California, they account for a large fraction of the total costs of cash benefits programs. Jn
1970, immigrant households accounted for only 13.5 percent of total expenditures on cash benefit
programs. By 1990, immigrants accounted for nearly a third of the cash benefits distributed.
Although an exact accounting of the fiscal impact of California's "immigration problem" is
beyond the scope of this paper, the last row of Table 13 suggests that the tax burden to
California's native taxpayers might be substantial. Immigrants in California are disproportionately
unskilled (not only relative to natives, but also relative to immigrants elsewhere in the United
States). In particular, even though California's immigrants account for 21.1 percent of the
households, immigrant households only receive 18.2 percent of the non-welfare income. To the
extent that a significant fraction of the costs of welfare programs are paid by state and local tax
revenues, it seems that California's immigrants are receiving a disproportionately high share of the
benefits and paying a disproportionately low share of the taxes.
VI. Summa
This paper uses the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Public Use Samples of the U.S. Census to
document the trends in immigrant welfare participation during the past two decades. The
empirical evidence convincingly indicates that immigrant participation in welfare programs is on28
the rise fortwo reasons.First, more recent immigrant waves are more likely to receive public
assistance. Second, immigrants "assimilate" into welfare, so that the probability thatimmigrants
participate in welfare programs actually increases (relative to that of natives) as theyage.
Ma result of these trends, the costs associated with immigrant participation inpublic
assistance programs have risen rapidly in recent years. By 1990, even though only 8.4percent of
households in the United States were foreign-born, these households accounted for 10.1percent
of all households that received public assistance, and for 13.1 percent of the total cash assistance
distributed. In California, where the concern over immigrant participation in welfareprograms
has generated a charged political debate, the 21.! percent of the households that are foreign-born
account for 27.0 of all households that receive public assistance, and for 32.0 percent of the total
cash assistance distributed in the state.
Although this type of accounting exercise is interesting, it is important to keep in mind
that the true costs of immigrant participation in welfare programs have little, if anythinQ, to do
with the bottom line of the ledger sheet. National expenditures on the AFDCprogram, after all,
only total about $22 billion annually. As the raging debate over welfare in the past thirty years
has shown, the debate is not over the $22 billion expenditure. Rather, it is over the possibility that
the current welfare system reduces work incentives, encouraQes the breakdown of the family unit
in low-income households, and nourishes the transmission of welfare dependency a:ross
generations.
There are substantial benefits associated with the immigration of unskilled workers: a
relative abundance of cheap labor for American companies and lower prices for consumers. The
trends in immigrant welfare participation documented in this paper raise serious questions as to
whether these benefits are sufficiently large to outweigh the increased expenditures on social29
programs as well as the costs associated with the potential creation of a new underr.r.;s. This
cost-benefit calculation will surely be a key component of the immigration debate that is likely to
dominate domestic public policy in the next decade.30
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